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BARGAINING POWER AND INDICATORS OF WELL-BEING  
AMONG BROTHEL-BASED SEX WORKERS IN INDIA 
 
 
Neha Hui 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study looks at determinants of bargaining power and well-being among women in sex work 
in India. Drawing on a questionnaire-based field survey of brothel-based sex workers from Delhi 
and Kolkata carried out between June and December 2013, it uses the capabilities approach to 
understand individual, occupational, and institutional determinants of bargaining power and 
well-being. The study considers bargaining power to be a latent, unobservable variable and 
estimates it using structural equation modeling. Findings indicate that both institutional and 
occupational factors play significant roles. The study differentiates between objective and 
subjective bargaining power. Some factors that play a significant role in determining objective 
bargaining power, such as years spent in sex work and residence in a brothel, may not play a role 
in determining subjective bargaining power. Conversely, factors such as marital status and caste 
play a significant role in determining subjective but not objective bargaining power. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This study aims to understand the determinants of bargaining power and consequently, well-
being of women in sex work in India. Bargaining power is understood here as the capacity of the 
sex worker to achieve or experience positive well-being outcomes given individual, institutional, 
and occupational constraints. These well-being outcomes are consequences of the individual’s 
negotiation with other agents inside and outside the trade, including pimps, madams, law 
enforcers, customers, family members, and partners. The individual’s bargaining power 
determines her ability to negotiate with these agents. Institutional factors, including social and 
patriarchal structures that result in stigma attached to the work can be expected to affect the 
individual’s bargaining power. Furthermore, occupational constraints resulting from both the 
legal and social framework within which the industry is situated can also be expected to have an 
impact. The illegal and illicit nature of the sex trade in much of the world including India results 
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in sex workers being forced to work and reside within the brothel setting, pay transactions costs 
to other agents like pimps and law enforcers, and face constraints on mobility between brothels 
or out of the industry. In this study, I consider bargaining power to be a latent, unobservable 
variable and as such, I analyze the impact of this latent variable on the well-being outcomes of 
sex workers in India. Furthermore, I posit that there may be a difference between the sex 
worker’s actual bargaining power and what she perceives her bargaining power to be. Her actual 
bargaining power manifests into her actual well-being outcomes, and I call that her “objective 
bargaining power.” This is differentiated from her “subjective bargaining power,” which 
corresponds to what she perceives is her capacity to negotiate and may not match her actual 
bargaining power.  
While the literature on social well-being uses a range of indicators to measure well-being, 
I confine myself to the capabilities approach interpretation, which defines well-being in terms of 
“freedom.” This is based on Sen’s conceptualization that freedom is viewed “both as primary 
end and as the principal means of development” (1999: xi). Freedom here is emphasized on 
“positive freedom” or the “capacity to be and do” (Gasper and van Staveren, 2003: 137) and the 
person achieves positive well-being when she experiences these positive freedoms (Sen 1985). 
This, in this paper we do not define well-being either in terms of cognitive evaluations of life, 
happiness, satisfaction or positive emotions (as done by Clark et al. 2008 and Easterlin 2004) or 
in terms pf economic or social measures of quality of life (Diener and Suh 1997). This paper 
interprets well-being in terms of the individual’s capacity to live a full positive life, as realized 
through the achievement of different ‘freedoms’ that we will discuss later. I furthermore pay 
attention to the intersectionality of the different roles a sex worker may play in her work and her 
private spheres. I look at the relationship between the resources that she has command and 
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control over – including institutional and occupational entitlements. My underlying argument is 
that while the sex worker may face physical, psychological, and financial constraints at the level 
of resources determined by the patriarchal framework within which they work, the final outcome 
of well-being is also affected by their individual capacity to negotiate – the bargaining ability of 
the sex worker. This power cannot be observed and may need to be treated as a latent variable.  
Mainstream economic literature has historically interpreted well-being in terms of income 
and consumption, which has been the basis for policy recommendation (Murgai and Ravallion 
2005). However, in recent years there has been significant criticism on the narrowness of this 
approach to understand the overall welfare and happiness of people (Basu 1987; Kahneman and 
Deaton 2010). In particular, Amartya Sen argued that “[t]he well-being achievement of a person 
can be seen as an evaluation of the ‘well-ness’ of the person’s state of being (rather than, say, the 
goodness of her contribution to the country, or her success in achieving her overall goals),” thus 
arguing for the shift in focus from economic outcomes especially in terms of income to a more 
holistic approach to well-being seen in terms of capabilities accommodating economic, political, 
and social capabilities ((1983:8). These capabilities reflect the freedom of a person to lead 
different types of lives. Freedom is not just the ability to live a life acquiring basic economic, 
health, and educational needs but additionally being able to live a full social and political life 
with human functioning. This includes freedom to be able to make one’s own decision, to be free 
from violence, and to have the freedom of mobility. The achievement of these freedoms would 
depend on not only the personal characteristics and attributes of the individual, but also her 
interactions within the social, institutional, and occupational settings where she lives and finally, 
her capacity to negotiate with other agents in these settings. In this study, I try to explore if there 
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exists any factors that link these individual, institutional, and occupational variables to the ability 
to live a life characterized by the freedom embodying the idea of “well-ness” mentioned earlier.  
What determines the mapping of resources to the well-being outcomes that an individual 
faces? I argue that there is a latent, underlying characteristic of the individual, which relates the 
resources that the individual can access to her interpersonal relationships with others, in the form 
of the outcome variables. I interpret this underlying latent concept as the “bargaining power,” or 
the capacity of the individual to negotiate her well-being vis-à-vis other agents with whom she 
interacts as a social, economic being. The problem with such a conceptualization of bargaining 
power is that it is not observable. I can use a latent construction and estimate the expected value 
of this latent construction as an indicator of bargaining power. I additionally consider self-
reported indicators of bargaining power, which may be given by a person’s perception of her 
ability to negotiate with other agents. Whether her perceived (self-reported) bargaining is 
equivalent to her actual bargaining (based on observable indicators) is an interesting question. I 
therefore build two latent bargaining variables, one for objective bargaining outcomes (based on 
the outcomes, including the indicators of decision making, mobility, agency, and retained 
earnings) and the other for subjective bargaining outcomes (based on perceived ability to 
negotiate).  
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
As mentioned, my interpretation of well-being is based on the capabilities approach that regards, 
and consequently seeks to measure, well-being as a multidimensional concept (Martinetti 2000). 
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Multi-dimensional well-being indices bring into consideration “commodities” or resources (that 
is, the set of all goods and services available to the individual) and functionings (that is, what an 
individual can be or do) in the broader set of capabilities, which includes all possible 
functionings within a range of opportunities from which they can choose (Bérenger and Verdier-
Chouchane 2007). Through its focus on the “full human being,” the capabilities approach calls 
for broad well-being concerns. Being a full human being for the capabilities theorists involves 
dignity and equality with respect to employment, bodily safety and integrity, basic nutrition, 
healthcare, education, and political voice (Nussbaum 2001). Consequently, scholarship within 
this framework analyzes the well-being of individuals involved in particular occupations. 
Examples include quality rather than quantity of employment (Sehnbruch 2004), respect and 
recognition within employment (Hill 2001), and dignity in employment (Sen 2001).  
Multiple studies have discussed institutional constraints faced by sex workers including 
stigma (Della Giusta, Di Tommaso, and Strøm 2008), prohibitionist legal framework (Nussbaum 
2000; Gangoli and Westmarland 2008; Della Giusta 2010; Scoular 2010), lack of mobility (Day 
and Ward 2004), transaction costs (Hui 2012), and community value and individual identity 
(Akerlof and Yellen 1994). Given these institutional factors, studies have looked at negotiation 
or bargaining within sex work in terms of empowerment. Using cases from Johannesburg, South 
Africa, Janet Maia Wojcicki and Josephine Malala look at empowerment beyond the ability to 
make choice but rather “emphasize the micro decision-making that occurs in sex-workers’ daily 
lives and recognize that these are important components of agency,” thus stressing that 
bargaining in sex work occurs beyond the sex worker as “victim” imagery (2001:101). Collective 
identity and network intervention have been linked to empowerment of individuals involved in 
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risky behavior, especially related to sexual services (Campbell and MacPhail 2002 for South 
Africa; Latkin et al. 2009 for Thailand and USA).  
Literature on India indicates that women struggling with nonliteracy, lower social status, 
and less economic opportunities are especially vulnerable to HIV infection, as sex work may be 
one of the few options available to them to earn money (Dandona et al. 2005). Furthermore, 
stigma and discrimination have been noted to be a hindrance to the empowerment of sex 
workers, resulting in fatalistic expectations that very little can be achieved in terms of 
community enterprises (Cornish 2006 using data from Kolkata). There is a significant amount of 
literature from India that identifies the relationship between individual and collective 
empowerment and a higher level of welfare. For example, Toorjo Ghose et al. (2008) have 
argued that sex workers in Kolkata report significantly lower rates of HIV infection and higher 
rates of condom usage as a consequence of community-based organization and advocacy. 
Broadening the discussion, Kim Blankenship et al. (2010) have looked at the associations 
between power and condom use among a sample of women sex workers, defining power in terms 
of collective power, control over work, and economic power in an attempt to create a 
multidimensional definition of empowerment for women sex workers in Andhra Pradesh, India. 
While the literature has identified institutional constraints on the well-being of sex 
workers and discussed issues of empowerment, the measurement of well-being and discussion 
(and measurement) of bargaining power is relatively new. This may be because bargaining 
power is not observable and may need to be analyzed as a latent construct. Maria Di Tommaso et 
al. (2009) have analyzed latent well-being deprivation among women in the Balkan region who 
are trafficked into sex work using the capabilities approach. However, to our knowledge, no such 
attempt has been made for the case of India, even though many authors have identified the 
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multidimensional nature of bargaining. Furthermore, there has been no attempt to distinguish 
between what may be an individual’s actual bargaining power and what she perceives to be her 
bargaining power. This study attempts to fill in this gap by building indices of actual and 
subjective bargaining power using a structural equation model (SEM).  
 
 
DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
The present study uses a questionnaire-based field survey of sex workers in two cities of India—
Delhi NCR (National Capital Region) and Kolkata.1 These two cities are respectively the second 
and third most populous metropolises in India.2 Delhi NCR is the political capital of India, and 
Kolkata is the eastern center of trade and commerce and capital of the state of West Bengal in 
eastern India. Both the cities attract migrant workers from within the country as well as from 
neighboring countries and have historically also been centers of sex trade (Bhagat and Mohanty 
2009). The urban sex trade in the two cities, however, differs significantly. Kolkata has 
experienced two decades of intense mobilizing and lobbying for the rights of sex workers by sex 
workers’ collectives and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), starting with the Sonagachi 
project in 1992 (Durbar Mahila Samanwaya Committee 1997). Though such lobbying and NGO 
activities are spreading to other parts of India, they are still in a comparatively nascent stage in 
Delhi. 
The field survey was carried out in Hindi and Bangla, in two areas of Delhi and five areas 
of Kolkata by the author with the help of research assistants between June and December 2013.3 
While four of the areas of Kolkata and one area of Delhi were exclusively red light zones,4 one 
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area each in Kolkata and Delhi served as a residential area for both sex-worker and non-sex 
worker populations. It is also important to note here that it was observed in both locations that 
many sex workers resided in the red light areas with their families (that is, with children and 
partners). In all, 251 women were interviewed, of whom 182 lived and worked in brothels 
around Kolkata and sixty-nine in Delhi. However, there was often incomplete information on 
some topics as the respondents chose not to reply to some questions because of the sensitivity of 
the question or due to time constraint. Hence, some of the results that are presented have a 
smaller number of observations. The sex workers interviewed were observed to hold different 
contracts with brothels where they worked. Contracts were usually either split (locally called 
adhiya,5 where the sex worker was able to keep fifty percent or less of their earning), 
independent (sex workers usually retained their earnings but paid a monthly, daily, or per 
customer rent), or “flying” (whereby they were not bound to any brothel, but would arrive at the 
brothel each morning and return each evening to their residence elsewhere in the city). Some sex 
workers also acted as pimps or madams. The sex workers reported a diverse range of rates 
charged per act depending on attractiveness and age of worker and location and kind of brothel. 
The lowest rate reported per act was INR 50 while the highest was INR 2,500.6 The sampling 
was done on the basis of snowball technique using resources made available by Kolkata-based 
NGO Durbar Mahila Samanway Committee. The data gathered constitutes information on 
various aspects of the lives and work of sex workers, as well as perceptions of stigma, well-
being, decision making, and bargaining power.  
 
 
MODEL SPECIFICATION 
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This study draws from work by Di Tommaso et al. (2009) on the use of latent variable analysis 
for unobservable factors determining well-being outcomes. Using data from the Counter 
Trafficking Module database, Di Tommaso et al. used well-being deprivation as a latent 
(unobservable) variable that determines freedom of movement, access to medical care, and abuse 
of women in sex work, and thereby estimate variables that influence well-being. The data they 
used primarily constitute women who have been trafficked and comprise only 8.5 percent of 
women who were in the trade by their own choice. The sample in this study is overrepresented in 
the other direction, as no sex worker in the present sample reported to the interviewers that she 
would be physically stopped from leaving the trade if she so chooses. This is not because there 
were no sex workers who faced such circumstances in the areas where the fieldwork was 
conducted, but because it was not possible for the field investigators to talk to such sex workers. 
While 23 percent of the present sample was trafficked into the trade, they no longer worked as a 
bonded sex worker.  
This study further differs from that of Di Tommaso et al. in three ways. First, outcome 
variables included here are decision making, retaining earnings, mobility, and financial agency, 
while for Di Tommaso et al. the outcome variables are abuse, access to healthcare, and mobility. 
In this study, there was not sufficient error-free information available to assess the access to 
healthcare, so I have not been able to include that as an outcome variable. Though I do have 
information on abuse, it is information on abuse faced by the sex workers in the past, unlike the 
rest of the variables (including latent bargaining power), which refer to the present. Second, this 
study interprets the transformation of the set of resources or entitlements to welfare outcomes in 
terms of bargaining power with the view that sex workers have a certain amount of control over 
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their well-being outcomes, but that is limited by their power of negotiation with others in the 
trade. Finally, this study also distinguishes between objective bargaining power and self-
perceived bargaining power.  
I will use an SEM  to estimate the overall well-being of the individual as the outcome of 
her unobservable bargaining power. This model allows us to build a system of equations that 
specifies the relationship between a set of observable exogenous variables (in this case the set of 
individual and institutional resources available to the sex worker) and a set of endogenous 
indicator variables (the well-being outcome variables) either directly or via an unobserved or 
unmeasured latent variable (which I call bargaining power). Figure 1 depicts the underlying 
relationships in the SEM. The intuitive argument here is that the individual’s experiences of her 
outcome variables (that is, her well-being indicators) are constrained by the individual or 
external exogenous factors (like age, skills, assets, community networks, among others) not just 
directly but also via the individual’s internal capacity to bargain (in this case the latent variable, 
bargaining power). Bargaining power is understood to be the capacity of the individual to 
negotiate with her institutional and occupational circumstances, including other agents in the 
trade, and translate them into the well-being outcomes she faces. This latent variable is presented 
in the oval figure while the observed exogenous and endogenous variables are presented in the 
rectangular figures.  
(Figure 1 here, third of a page) 
Following Bollen (1987), Karl G. Jöreskog and Arthur S. Goldberger (1975), and Jaya 
Krishnakumar and A. L. Nager (2008), I specify the SEM as follows: 
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Let the latent variable y* be linearly determined by a vector of observable exogenous 
variables: X. I have the following structural model, which assumes that the relationship between 
the exogenous variables and the latent variable is linear.  
y*= α’X+ε 
In the present analysis, the latent variable y* is bargaining power and X= {x1, x2,...,xk } 
corresponds to a host of individual and institutional attributes of the respondent and ε is the 
disturbance. 
The latent variable in turn affects a vector of observable endogenous variables Y= 
{y1,y2,...,ym}, which in this case are the well-being outcome variables, subject to errors u= {u1, 
u2,...,um.}. It is assumed that the errors are mutually independent, have means equal to 0 and are 
uncorrelated with the exogenous variables. The observable endogenous variables may also be 
directly influenced by some of the observable exogenous variables. We have the measurement 
model, depicting the relationship between the exogenous variable, the latent variable, and the 
endogenous observed variables.  
Y=βy*+ γX+ u 
Thus I have a scalar y* and set of vectors Y=( y1,y2,...,ym) ,which correspond to the set of 
well-being outcome variables, X=(x1,x2,...,xk): the individual, institutional, and occupational 
attributes, α= (α1,α2,...,αk): the coefficients corresponding to the equation for the latent variable, 
β=(β1,β2,...,βm): the coefficients corresponding to the outcome variables, and γ=(γ1, γ2,..., γm): the 
coefficients corresponding to the direct relationship between the exogenous observed variables 
and the endogenous variables.  
The vector β corresponds to the underlying relationship between the latent bargaining 
power and observed well-being outcomes and is interpreted as the magnitude of expected change 
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in the observed variable (the well-being outcomes) due to a unit change in the latent variable 
(bargaining power). It is necessary to assign a scale to the latent variable to be able to interpret 
the coefficient. Typically, the latent variable is set to a scale equal to one of the indicator 
variables. I estimate α, β, and γ using STATA software.  
Some points of concern are noted here. Structural equation modeling assumes 
components of vector Y to be continuous. However, as I will discuss later, our outcome variables 
are a mix of cardinal and continuous variables, and this may have implications on the inference. I 
hypothesize that there exists a latent continuous counterpart of the categorical variables where 
the latent maps one to one with the observed categorical variables (Di Tommaso et al. 2009). The 
second concern is that the standardized estimation uses maximum likelihood estimator, which 
assumes the joint distribution between Y and X to be multivariate normal. This may be 
restrictive in our case (Muthén 1984). STATA allows for flexibility in estimation by using a 
generalized structural equation model (GSEM) where I can estimate for categorical outcome 
variables using quasi maximum likelihood, and the assumption of normality is handled by 
adjusting the standard error (StataCorp 2013). However, the disadvantage with a GSEM is that I 
cannot test for the goodness of fit. Further, a GSEM does not allow us to obtain standardized 
coefficients, which are crucial for interpretation of the model. I have separately run both a SEM 
and GSEM as both have some advantage over the other and compare the estimates as robustness 
check. However, I will only report the results from the SEM, as the GSEM results did not 
provide any additional information to what I have from the SEM. The GSEM results are 
available on request.  
 
 
 14 
VARIABLES 
 
Following the model specification it is crucial to identify the observed exogenous and 
endogenous variables of the model. To reiterate, the exogenous variables are the individual, 
occupational, and institutional characteristics and factors like age, skills, assets, occupational 
status, and so on, which determine and constrain the endogenous well-being experiences of the 
individual, including her capacity to make decisions, mobility, and retaining earnings. The 
exogenous characteristics affect the endogenous well-being variables both directly and indirectly 
through an unobserved individual characteristic, which I call the bargaining power.  
 
 
Exogenous variables 
 
The exogenous variables indicate the individual, institutional, and occupational resources 
available to the individual. 
Individual characteristics: These include age and attractiveness of the sex worker,7 her 
skills, including her level of education and whether she has children (dummy variable). Age of 
the sex worker was found to be significantly correlated with the number of years spent in the 
trade.8 To avoid collinearity I have only included number of years spent in the trade (continuous 
variable), as it includes both an indication of age and experience of the sex worker, both of 
which are individual characteristics that are crucial for the determination of her bargaining 
power. Education has been reduced to a single dummy variable – educated (secondary school or 
more, dummy variable). I have also included the log of rate per short term sexual service 
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provided as an exogenous variable as it may indicate the sex worker’s desirability in the market 
and may be a proxy for her attractiveness and skills in the trade.9 It may also point toward how 
much of individual monetary resources the sex worker may access.  
Occupational characteristics: Whether the sex worker was trafficked in the trade and 
whether she lives in the brothel are both occupational characteristics that may distinguish her 
position in the brothel vis-à-vis others in the trade, and consequently influence how much 
bargaining power she has and her well-being outcomes. A sex worker who is trafficked in the 
trade may be expected to have low bargaining power, at least to start, and the bargaining power 
may grow over time. Women who live in the brothel (as opposed to those who come in for work 
but return to a different location of residence at the end of the day) may on the one hand be less 
susceptible to institutionalized violence in the trade and have more community and family 
support outside the trade, but they may have less opportunity to build networks within the trade.  
Institutional Characteristics: A sex worker’s institutional characteristics would include 
her marital status (in our model, the dummy variable married), her caste and religious affiliations 
(the dummy variable Hindu high caste),10 and her access to organizations and collectives that 
operate (the categorical variable Involvement with collectives). I consider marital status as an 
institutional characteristic (rather than individual characteristic) because for a sex worker, 
marriage is often seen as a separate and mutually conflicting institution to their trade. For the sex 
worker, marriage comes with a set of norms and regulations that are often at odds with the 
requirements of the trade. Thus, the effect of marital status on bargaining power is institutional, 
rather than individual. Involvement with collectives that work in close proximity to the trade 
may be seen as another crucial institutional characteristic and a determinant of the bargaining 
power of the sex workers. Since much of the information was gathered with the help of 
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organizations working in Kolkata and Delhi, the data is biased against those in the trade who 
have no support from organizations. However, even within the information collected, there is a 
range of degree of involvement with collectives. While many sex workers may only be nominal 
members of the collective, some were more active members. Based on their involvement with 
the collective I have given them a ranking from 0 to 4. A rank of 0 is given to sex workers who 
are either not aware or not members of any collective. A rank of 1 is given to those who are only 
nominal members. A rank of 2 is given to those who are more than nominal members and 
participate in rallies or protest marches or in campaigns for the cause. A rank of 3 is given to 
those who are “peer” workers or are members of the organization who are involved in 
implementation of the collective’s campaigns (usually health related) among the sex workers. 
Finally, a rank of 4 is given to higher involvement, often in the decision-making as well as 
organizational roles in the collective. The higher the rank, the greater is the involvement with the 
collectives, and the higher the expected benefits from the operation of collectives in the locality. 
Sample statistics of the exogenous variables are presented in Table 1. 
(Table 1 here, one page) 
 
Endogenous variables 
 
Two types of endogenous variables will be considered here, and each type will correspond to a 
different kind of bargaining power. I will first consider a set of endogenous variables that I call 
objective indicators of well-being. These will include outcomes including decision making, 
mobility, financial agency, and the capacity to retain earnings.11 These variables are considered 
to be the manifestation of a latent variable that I will call objective bargaining power. This set of 
 17 
variables will be distinguished from another set of endogenous variables, which I call self-
perceived or subjective indicators of well-being. The self-perceived indicators correspond to how 
the sex workers themselves rate their bargaining power, and these indicators will be the 
manifestation of what I call the subjective bargaining power. The distinction between the two 
latent bargaining variables gives us the opportunity to compare the sex worker’s actual 
bargaining position to what she perceives her bargaining position to be. The understanding 
behind the differentiation is that perception of bargaining may be affected more by institutional 
factors than the actual bargaining.  
 
 
Objective bargaining power 
 
Decision making: In the dataset, there are six ordinal, self-reported variables that represent 
decision making. The respondent was asked about her decision-making capacity regarding 1) 
how many customers she had to provide services to, 2) her children’s future, 3) clothes she wears 
at work, 4) her finances, 5) use of condoms with customers, 6) use of condoms with partners. 
The responses were in the form of self, joint (with one or more other agent including madam, 
pimp, customer, partner or husband, or family member), and other (including madam, pimp, 
customer, partner or husband, or family member). For every question, a sex worker who 
indicated making a decision by herself was seen as a positive outcome and was given a point of 
+1. Joint decision making and no response were given 0 (as it is not necessarily negative, but 
does not indicate positive agency of the sex worker). Someone else making the decision was 
given a point of -1 as that has negative indication on the agency of the sex worker. The decision-
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making variables can broadly be categorized into variables that represent 1) decision making in 
the brothel (decisions regarding number of customers, attire, and condom usage with customers 
who are not regulars or partners), and 2) decision making regarding other aspects of life, 
especially the household (decisions regarding the future of children, finance, condoms with 
partners or other customers). For the SEM, I generate variables: ability to make decisions 
regarding work by oneself and ability to make decisions regarding nonwork aspects by oneself, 
with equal weights to each of the underlying decision-making variables (each of these variables 
takes values between -3 to +3). The percentage of sample in each category is presented in Table 
2. A higher frequency of sex workers seems to be able to make decisions (on their own) 
regarding work as opposed to decisions regarding other aspects. The capacity to make decisions 
(by oneself) regarding finances and condom use with partners or regular costumers is particularly 
low (with only 15.0 percent and 26.3 percent respectively being able to make decisions by 
themselves). A sex worker with high (latent) bargaining power may be expected to be able to 
make more decisions by herself.  
Mobility: Another outcome or indicator variable of interest may be mobility. This would 
directly be an indicator of “bodily integrity” in Nussbaum’s list of capabilities. While a number 
of studies suggest that sex workers, especially those coerced into the trade, face very restricted 
mobility, it is quite likely that sex workers operating under such circumstances would not have 
been allowed to talk to the surveyors who conducted the present field study. However, though 
the respondents in the present study had mobility within the red light area (there was indication 
that most of them were not physically tied or bonded to the brothels), they faced restricted 
mobility with regard to going outside the city, especially to their hometowns, as well as with 
regard to participation in local events and meetings. This restriction was more a result of stigma 
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associated with the trade, as well as because of concerns over personal safety. Summary statistics 
for the mobility variables are also presented in Table 2. Except in the case of “mobility to go to 
cinema on their own or with friends (not clients),” more than 60 percent of women said “yes” to 
all the other mobility variables. I reduced the five mobility variables (mobility to visiting 
hometown, to participate in local events, to participate in political events and meetings, to go to 
cinema, and to access hospitals) to a single variable that I call ‘overall mobility’, with equal 
weights to the underlying variables. The variable takes values between 0 and 5, with the value 0 
corresponding to individuals who said “yes” to none of the mobility variables and 5 
corresponding to individuals who said “yes” to all of them.  
Agency (financial): An additional indicator of well-being can be whether the respondents 
feel they are able to have a bank account in their own name and whether they can borrow money 
to start their own business. While these aspects may not directly indicate whether the respondent 
faces coercive restrictions to mobility, they may indicate agency based on various other factors. 
Thus I have two agency variables (“Agency to open bank account” and “Agency to borrow 
money to start business”), both of which are binary variables.  
Retaining earnings: Retained earnings as an outcome variable indicates how much of her 
earnings the sex worker is able to keep. This is an indicator of the bargaining power of the sex 
worker in the trade and points toward the transactions costs faced by her in the trade vis-à-vis 
other agents.12 Proportion of earnings retained is a continuous variable that can take values 
between 0 and 1. A value equal to 0 represents a situation where the sex worker has to forego all 
of her earnings to the brothel managers, while that of 1 indicates that she gets to keep all that she 
earns. What she has to forego can include charges for the brothel or rent, costs of pimp, bribes to 
authority, and in some cases cost of food. Summary statistics are presented in Table 2. On 
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average, a sex worker would retain 77 percent of her earnings, and 23 percent would go to the 
brothel where she works.  
(Table 2 here, half page) 
 
Subjective bargaining power  
 
In what follows, I look at what the sex workers perceive their bargaining and agency to be. This 
analysis is based on a set of six statements from the questionnaire in which the sex workers were 
asked to give a ranking of 1 to 5 to each statement, with 1 corresponding to strongly agree and 5 
corresponding to strongly disagree. The questions and the responses are summarized in Table 3. 
The latent variable subjective bargaining power is interpreted as an unobserved individual 
characteristic that establishes the sex worker’s perceived bargaining power and manifests in the 
form of the subjective bargaining outcomes summarized in Table 3. High perceived bargaining 
power (latent) can be expected to correspond to high subjective bargaining outcomes. 
(Table 3 here, half page) 
 
 
ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
As mentioned earlier, I have modeled both objective and subjective bargaining power using an 
SEM. I reported the standardized coefficients of the SEM estimated using maximum likelihood 
method. Standardized coefficients, which give the change in units of standard deviation of the 
dependent variable for one standard deviation unit change in the independent variable, is 
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preferred over normal coefficients because the former allows us to compare the coefficients in 
size when the variables have different measurement units (Krishnakumar and Ballon 2008).  
 
 
Objective bargaining power 
 
Table 4a describes the role of latent variable objective bargaining power in determining well-
being outcomes of the sex worker. One additional standard deviation unit of years spent in the 
industry and involvement in NGOs and collectives increases objective bargaining power by 
about a third standard deviation unit of bargaining power. Living in brothels has a negative and 
significant effect on objective bargaining power. Contrary to expectation, individual and 
institutional factors like religion and caste, marital status, children, and level of education do not 
influence objective bargaining power. All of the well-being outcome variables are significantly 
affected by the latent bargaining power variable, indicating that all of the well-being variables 
are affected by the individual’s occupational factors via their bargaining power. Of the well-
being variables, bargaining power seems to affect decision making at work the most, with a 
standardized coefficient of 0.761. Objective bargaining power seems to affect the agency 
variables the least, with one standard deviation increase in objective bargaining power resulting 
in 0.281 and 0.255 standard deviation increases, respectively, in agency to open bank account 
and agency to borrow money for business.  
(Table 4a here, one page) 
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Direct effects 
 
Individual, institutional, and occupational factors may also directly influence the well-being 
outcomes of the sex worker. To get an indication of which exogenous variables may directly 
affect the endogenous well-being outcomes and to ensure a better fit of the model, I used 
modification indices to free parameters and add paths from some of the exogenous variables to 
the endogenous well-being outcomes. The paths added correspond to Table 4b. Individual and 
institutional factors seem to directly affect outcome variables more significantly than having an 
indirect effect via the bargaining power variable. Being married positively and significantly 
affects the ability to make decisions regarding work, and having children has a positive and 
significant effect on decisions that are not linked with work. Being Hindu and of higher caste 
positively and significantly affects agency to borrow money for business. These results may 
indicate that there are norms relating to the institution of marriage, having children, and being 
Hindu and of higher caste that override the stigma associated with sex work, thus directly 
affecting the individual’s well-being without having to enter her capacity to negotiate or her 
bargaining power. Log of rate per short term sexual services provided has negative effect on the 
amount of money the sex worker is able to retain but positively influences her overall mobility.  
(Table 4b here, one page) 
The value of chi-squared in this model is 0.0937. This value together with the comparative fit 
index of greater than 0.90 and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) of less than 
0.8 indicates that the model has a satisfactory fit (Hair et al. 2009).  
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Subjective bargaining power 
 
In Table 5 I report the structural model for subjective bargaining power. Subjective bargaining 
power differs from objective bargaining power in the sense that it corresponds to a set of 
outcomes that measure what the sex worker perceives her bargaining to be. Only involvement 
with NGOs continues to be significant, indicating that involvement with NGOs improves both 
the actual as well as perceived bargaining power of a person. Interestingly, unlike in the case of 
objective bargaining power, marital status and rate of sexual services provided are positively and 
significantly related to the latent bargaining power, and being Hindu high caste is negative and 
significant. These results indicate that being married and being attractive, both seen as positive 
characteristics, may help sex workers perceive themselves as better at bargaining than they 
actually are. Moreover, while being a high caste Hindu entails adherence to more strict gender 
norms and consequently links to greater stigma related to sexuality and sex work, on the one 
hand, historically, membership within these castes was linked to ownership of land and property 
and hence more affluence. This may indicate that sex workers who are in this category perceive 
themselves worse off because they are comparing their position to other members from their 
caste background and hence perceive themselves to have lower bargaining power than they 
actually have (in terms of well-being outcomes). Subjective bargaining power significantly 
affects the sex worker’s perceived ability to deal with problems with madams and violent 
customers, and her ability to deal with sudden trouble in the trade. However, it does not affect 
her perception of whether she is able to move to a different profession. Furthermore, the 
standardized coefficients corresponding to dealing with madam and violent customers (0.850 and 
0.965, respectively) is higher than the perceived ability to deal with sudden trouble in the trade. 
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This result indicates that sex workers do not perceive increased bargaining power with an 
increase in ability to overcome emergency situations in the trade or ability to leave the 
profession. In the case of the subjective bargaining model, the chi-squared value is less than 
0.05, which is the minimum requirement for acceptable fit. However, in case of small samples, 
the chi-square value may be sensitive, and I need to rely on other goodness of fit measures. Since 
the comparative fit index (CFI) and Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) are both greater than 0.90 and 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) is less than 0.062 I may still deem the 
model to have a satisfactory fit.  
(Table 5 here, one page) 
Following the estimations, I compute the factor score of our two latent bargaining power 
variables. Since the two latent variables do not have the same unit of measurement, they are not 
comparable unless they are normalized.13 Figures 2 and 3, respectively, show the distributions of 
normalized objective and subjective bargaining power. Objective bargaining power is skewed 
left, while subjective bargaining power is multimodal.  
(Figure 2 and 3 here, one page in all) 
The objective and subjective bargaining powers are weakly and positively correlated with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.246. This is illustrated in Figure 4.  
(Figure 4 here, half page) 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
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This study is in line with recent scholarship on sex work, which has moved from the “victim” 
imagery of sex work to questions of empowerment. Rather than limiting to well-being in terms 
of subjective indicators of happiness and positive emotions, or objective indicators of quality of 
life, I try to understand well-being as freedom to live a positive life. Well-being in this paper is 
understood as an outcome of empowerment, which in turn is a multidimensional concept that 
combines external individual, occupational, and institutional constraints with internal (to the 
individual concerned) capacity to bargain, and manifests in the form of well-being outcomes. 
These well-being outcomes are comprehended in terms of “freedom” within capabilities 
approach and correspond to the ability to live a full social and political life with human 
functionings including the capacity to make one’s own decisions, live a life free from violence, 
freedom of mobility, dignity, and so on. 
To this effect, the study has identified the idea of bargaining power as a latent in-between 
that indirectly links the individual, occupational, and institutional constraints faced by the sex 
worker to the well-being outcomes. In this study, the outcomes considered are capacity to make 
decisions, freedom of mobility, agency, ability to retain earnings, and absence of abuse. The 
choice of variables is influenced by literature on empowerment in general, but also specifically 
by the literature on sex work. However, the choice of variables has also been limited by 
availability of data and may have resulted in omitted variable bias.  
Results indicate that some individual, occupational, and institutional variables have 
significant effect on bargaining power and, consequently, on the determination of well-being 
outcome variables. Specifically, involvement with NGOs and collectives seems to positively 
affect bargaining power. However, it should be noted that there are differences in what 
 26 
determines actual (objective) and perceived (subjective) bargaining. There are indications that 
stigma implicitly affects perceived bargaining power more than actual bargaining power.  
There are two major limitations in this study. As mentioned earlier, it was not possible to 
interview sex workers who are presently facing abusive conditions or who have been trafficked 
into the trade very recently because of the coercive conditions under which they live. This results 
in sample selection bias due to the nonrandom nature of sampling. Therefore, I am not making 
any claims on generality of bargaining power among sex workers based on this study, as I am 
forced to omit the section of the population that may be faced with very low levels of bargaining 
power. The second limitation of the study is due to the measurement error in the data, as all the 
well-being outcomes correspond to responses by the sex workers. The exercise of differentiating 
between objective and subjective bargaining power may to a certain extent implicitly 
acknowledge this problem by recognizing bias toward the sex worker’s own perception of her 
bargaining power.  
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Figure 1 SEM with latent variable bargaining power  
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Figure 2 Histogram of objective bargaining power 
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Figure 3 Histogram of subjective bargaining power 
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Figure 4 Scatterplot showing relationship between objective and subjective bargaining powers  
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Table 1 Exogenous variables: Individual, institutional, and occupational attributes of women sex 
workers in Delhi and Kolkata   
Variables Percentage 
Age group 
18–23 17.46 
24–29 23.81 
30–35 27.38 
36–41 15.87 
42–47 6.75 
>48 8.73 
Education 
No education  56.22 
Enrolled 13.65 
Finished primary 8.03 
Incomplete secondary 15.26 
Complete secondary 5.22 
Higher education 2.81 
Marital status 
Never married 11.9 
Married 28.17 
Divorced/separated 35.71 
Widow 7.54 
With partner 15.48 
Not reported 1.19 
Children 
Yes 79.35 
No 20.65 
Religion 
Hindu 70.45 
Muslim 25.91 
Other 3.64 
Caste (among Hindus) 
Scheduled caste 39.66 
Scheduled tribe 5.03 
General 55.31 
Involvement with NGOs/ 
Collectives 
None 35.1 
  Only nominal members 46.94 
Only participations in rallies/events 2.04 
Peer worker 12.24 
Supervisors/organizational committee 
member 
3.67 
Trafficked 
Yes 23.46 
No 76.54 
Reside in brothel  
Yes 54.66 
No 45.44 
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Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
log of rate per short term sexual service 
provided 
223 5.353 0.768 3.912 7.824 
Years spent in the industry 245 9.583 10.082 0 49 
 
Table 2 Endogenous variables: Indicators of objective well-being of women sex workers in Delhi 
and Kolkata   
Makes decisions by oneself (percentage of total sample)  Obs. Self Joint/ NA other 
 Ability to make decisions regarding work by oneself     
How many customers 247 74.49 1.21 24.29 
Condom usage with one off customers 247 88.66 0.81 10.53 
Clothes she wears (at work or otherwise) 247 94.33   1.21 4.45 
Ability to make decisions regarding nonwork aspects      
Finance  247 14.98 1.21 83.81 
Future of children 247 76.02 1.53 22.45 
Condom usage with partner/regular customer 247 26.32 39.27 34.41 
General mobility (percentage of total sample) Obs. Yes No 
Can visit hometown as frequently as she chooses 246 70.33 29.67 
Can participate in local events 244 64.90 35.10 
Can participate in meetings 245 63.30 36.70 
Can access healthcare on her own 245 82.04 17.96 
Can go to the cinema on her own or with friends (not clients) 244 48.16 51.84 
Agency (percentage of total sample) Obs. Yes No 
Agency to open bank account 245 59.18 40.82 
Agency to borrow money to start business 245 16.73 83.27 
Retains earnings Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
220 0.77 0.27 0 1 
Note: Sex workers who do not have children have been put in the category joint/NA. 
 
Table 3 Endogenous variables: Indicators of subjective well-being being of women sex workers 
in Delhi and Kolkata (percent)  
Variable Obs. Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral  Agree Strongly 
agree 
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I am able to deal with problems with my madam 
243 8.23 13.58 24.28 21.81 32.1 
I am able to deal with violent customers 
245 6.53 14.69 20.41 21.22 37.14 
I am able to deal with sudden crisis in the trade 
245 4.49 10.2 17.55 23.67 44.08 
I will be able to move to a different occupation if I so want 
244 20.9 16.39 6.97 12.7 43.03 
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Table 4a SEM for objective bargaining power 
Estimates of the coefficients of latent objective bargaining power on the observed endogenous outcome variables 
(β in the model) 
Variables  Standardized 
coefficient 
(standard error) 
Ability to make decisions regarding work by oneself  0.761*** 
 
(0.074) 
Ability to make decisions regarding nonwork aspects  0.447*** 
 
(0.068) 
Retains earnings 0.375*** 
 
(0.073) 
Overall mobility 0.464** 
 
(0.086) 
Agency to open bank account  0.281*** 
 
(0.092) 
Agency to borrow money for business 0.255*** 
 
(0.082) 
Regression coefficients of the observed exogenous variables on the latent variable objective bargaining power (α’ 
in the model) 
Hindu high caste  0.110 
 
(0.108) 
Married -0.010 
 
(0.098) 
log of rate per short term sexual service provided -0.079 
 
(0.087) 
Years spent in the industry  0.305*** 
 
(0.091) 
Involvement with NGO 0.345*** 
 
(0.076) 
Trafficked -0.110 
 
(0.091) 
Has children  -0.068 
 
(0.078) 
Lives in brothel  -0.188** 
 
(0.085) 
Secondary school -0.037 
 
(0.083) 
Number of observations 217 
Goodness of fit 
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chi2 0.094 
CFI 0.941 
TLI 0.894 
RMSEA 0.043 
Notes: Standard errors in are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 
and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Table 4b Direct effect of relevant observed exogenous variables on endogenous outcome 
variables (γ in the model) 
Ability to make decisions regarding work 
Exogenous variables Standardized coefficient  
(standard error) 
Hindu high caste  -0.124 
 
(0.082) 
Married 0.162** 
 
(0.071) 
Ability to make decisions regarding nonwork aspects 
Hindu high caste  0.447 
 
(0.071) 
Has children 0.252*** 
 
(0.060) 
Retains earnings 
log of rate per short term sexual service provided -0.143** 
 
(0.066) 
Years spent in the industry 0.215*** 
 
(0.068) 
Lives in brothel -0.144** 
 
(0.065) 
Overall   mobility 
log of rate per short term sexual service provided 0.197*** 
 
(0.069) 
Years spent in the industry -0.095 
 
(0.082) 
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Trafficked 0.173 
 
(0.071) 
Lives in brothel -0.042 
 
(0.071) 
Agency to open bank account  
Involvement with NGO 0.242*** 
 
(0.070) 
Lives in brothel 0.113* 
 
(0.064) 
Agency to borrow money for business 
Hindu high caste  0.126* 
 
(0.069) 
Notes: Standard errors in are in parentheses. ***, **, *  denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 
and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 SEM for subjective bargaining power 
Estimates of the coefficients of latent Subjective bargaining power on the observed endogenous outcome variables (β in the 
model) 
Variables  Standardized 
coefficient 
(standard error) 
I am able to deal with problems with the madam 0.850*** 
 
(0.028) 
I am able to deal with violent customers 0.965*** 
 
(0.024) 
I am able to deal with sudden trouble in the trade 0.669*** 
 
(0.040) 
I am able to move to a different profession if I so desire 0.168 
 
(0.024) 
  
Regression coefficients of the observed exogenous variables on the latent variable objective bargaining power (α’ in the 
model) 
Hindu high caste  -0.126* 
 
(0.067) 
Married 0.109* 
 
(0.070) 
log of rate per short term sexual service provided 0.203*** 
 
(0.0712) 
Years spent in the industry  0.129 
 
(0.078) 
Involvement with NGO 0.201*** 
 
(0.068) 
Trafficked 0.048 
 
(0.077) 
Has children -0.002 
 
(0.067) 
Lives in brothel -0.007 
 
(0.0673) 
Secondary school 0.088 
 
(0.073) 
Goodness of fit 
chi2 0.0037 
CFI 0.941 
TLI 0.913 
RMSEA 0.06 
Number of observations 220 
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Notes: Standard errors in are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 
and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
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NOTES 
 
1 Kolkata is the new name for the city in eastern India that was historically known as Calcutta. 
2 According to the Census of India 2011, the population of Kolkata is 14,112,536 and that of 
Delhi is 16,314,838. 
3 All personal information that would allow the identification of any person(s) described in the 
article has been removed.  
4 Red light areas are zones exclusively relegated for brothel-based sex work. 
5 Literally translating to “half.” 
6 1 Indian Rupee is equivalent to US$0.015 (August 2016). 
7 Attractiveness is in terms of socially constructed ideals of beauty. 
8 The correlation coefficient between age and years spent in the trade in my data is 0.7. 
9 Several studies have shown that there is a positive relationship between attractiveness and 
economic outcomes, especially income (Solnick and Schweitzer 1999; Rooth 2009), and 
particularly so in the case of sex work (Islam and Smyth 2012). I am using rate of services 
provided as a proxy as it is difficult to measure attractiveness, especially since it is a subjective 
concept and varies according to social and cultural perspectives.  
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10 The link between caste and prostitution in South Asia has been documented in the literature. 
Caste acts as an important factor resulting in entry of women into sex work, both directly and 
indirectly. Caste is often a hereditary mode of entry into the trade, especially for certain castes 
that specialize in providing sexual services. The Bedia community from Rajasthan (Agarwal 
2014), Badi community in Nepal (Cox 1992), Nat community from north of India (Swarankar 
2007), and Devdasi communities from the south of India (Omvedt 1983; Torri 2009) are 
examples of castes where women’s hereditary occupation is sex work. Though women in many 
of such communities are expected to give consent about entering the trade, this is often only 
token consent as labor market alternatives are limited and age of entry in the trade (usually upon 
entry into puberty) is often too low to be able to provide informed consent. Caste is also an 
indirect route of entry into poverty (Gang, Sen, and Yun 2008), and poverty is one of the most 
important factors influencing entry into sex work (Cornish 2006).  
11 One well-being outcome variable that is conspicuously missing here is vulnerability to abuse. 
While a lot of literature focuses on violence faced by women in sex work (Church 2001; Sanders 
and Campbell 2007; Shannon and Csete 2010), it is important to note that respondents to the 
present survey reported violence that they had faced both within and outside the trade. Thirty-
nine percent of the sex workers reported to have faced physical (including sexual), mental, or 
psychological violence at home before joining the trade, and 21 percent reported to have faced 
violence in their previous occupation. The occupation of sex work is also characterized by 
violence at various stages. Thirty-two percent of the respondents faced violence at entry, and 23 
percent of the respondents had to work as bonded sex workers (that is, a form of contract which 
entails that the sex workers work in brothels without any autonomy or access to earnings) at 
some point in their lives. Forty-two percent had faced one or more forms of violence in their 
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career, including physical abuse, rape, and police violence. However, it was not possible to 
interview sex workers who were presently in abusive circumstances, as they would be less likely 
to give coercion-free responses. Furthermore, since the data is not over time, it was not possible 
to verify if there has been any change in the vulnerability to abuse. I have therefore not included 
abuse in the SEM but have elsewhere estimated the vulnerability to violence by using a logit 
model. The results are available on request.  
12 I define retained earnings as follows:  
Proportion of earnings retained = (R-TC)/R, 
where R = rate at which a sex worker provides sexual services, and TC = the amount she has to 
pay to the managers of the brothel for every time she provides services to a client.  
13 Following Krishnakumar and Ballon (2008), I use the following formula to normalize the 
score: 
 𝑦∗
𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑
=  
𝑦∗−𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑚𝑖𝑛
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